There is a clear perception all over the world that in the first instance, it was a “wrong” war to start. Some people describe the “war on terror” as a “semantic, strategic and legal perversion because terrorism is not an enemy with an agreed and globally acceptable definition; it is only a method of combat.”
THE US “WAR ON terror” is now the main focus of the newly-elected president, Barack Hussain Obama. As the direction of the new strategy is still unfolding, there is a clear perception all over the world that in the first instance, it was a “wrong” war to start. Some people describe the “war on terror” as a "semantic, strategic and legal perversion because terrorism is not an enemy with an agreed and globally acceptable definition; it is only a method of combat." One doesn't wage a war against a “method” of combat, and needs to have an enemy to fight against.
The term “war on terror” is also a misnomer, resulting in distorted ideas of the main threat facing the US and the world today. Terrorism is only a means to an end; in this respect, a "war on terror" makes no more sense than a war on submarines. There can be no two opinions on the need to combat terrorism. But to eliminate this evil, its root causes will have to be addressed. To address its root causes is not to justify terrorism, but to understand it and then to overcome it. We can kill or capture terrorists; disrupt their operations; destroy their organizations; but unless we prevent others from following their path, we cannot succeed in eliminating terrorism. To win the war against terrorism, we must win the hearts and minds of those who are susceptible to sympathize and support the tactics of terrorism.
An increasing number of security experts, politicians, and policy organizations consider the war on terror a counterproductive military process which has not only alienated the US globally but is also fueling a pro-terrorist sentiment and helping terrorist recruitment. Even the American media now feels that this decision was a big mistake. From being a righteous war when it started, the US war on terror is no longer considered a righteous war. It is generally considered a wrong war. It has not gone beyond retribution and retaliation. In pursuing this war, George W.Bush claimed to be in direct communication with God and insisted he was driven with a mission from God. In the name of God, Bush played havoc with the world. Apparently, he also had a divine mission to protect and strengthen world's military dictators and authoritarian regimes.
According to Washington Post, “in the name of the war on terror, we have invaded and occupied a country that had nothing to do with the attacks of 9/11, we have emboldened our enemies, we have lost and taken many lives, we have spent trillions of dollars, we have sacrificed civil liberties, and we have jettisoned our commitment to human dignity.” But was it an honest mistake? Did Bush and Vice President Cheney declare war because they genuinely believed it was the best way to guarantee the safety of the American people? Or did they do it in a premeditated -- and ultimately successful -- attempt to seize greater political power?”
These are questions that history alone will answer. But history has already started giving its verdict. During his last visit to Baghdad, two size 10 shoes were hurled at George W.Bush in full force and in public gaze by a journalist as a “farewell gift” in the name of the people killed in that war. His policies are being openly criticized in America as well as in the world at large.
His successor, President Obama is taking practical steps to distance himself from the Bush belligerence. During his election campaign, he had pledged to end the war in Iraq, and to take the war in Afghanistan to its “logical” conclusion.
To address its root causes is not to justify terrorism, but to understand it and then to overcome it. We can kill or capture terrorists; disrupt their operations; destroy their organizations; but unless we prevent others from following their path, we cannot succeed in eliminating terrorism.
The new Obama strategy is based on the recognition that military force alone is not a solution to the problems in this region. In an interview on CBS's 60 Minutes program on March 22, Obama acknowledged publicly that military force would not end the war in Afghanistan and admitted that “there has to be an exit strategy” for this war. . The most stunning statement Obama has made so far on this issue was in his interview to The New York Times in March this year when he was asked if the United States was winning in Afghanistan. He replied flatly, “No” also indicating that Washington might be opening the door for cooperation with moderate elements among the Taliban.
Later, his Defense Secretary Robert Gates also gave a similar indication by saying that a political agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban might be acceptable if the insurgents laid down their arms. This reflects a big change in the US thinking. The idea of cooperation with some in the Taliban has been talked about for many months by American military commanders, including Adm Michael Mullen and Gen. Petraeus. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has gone to the extent of stating openly that the war in Afghanistan is a "long-term prospect" which cannot be won in one year, and that American public as well as the troops were pretty tired.
These are clear signals of the changing mood in Washington where plans to get the US forces out of Afghanistan may already be in progress. In February this year, outlining a strategy for Afghanistan, Henry Kissinger had cautioned the Obama administration that it faced dilemmas familiar to several of its predecessors. According to him, the stakes were high, and “America cannot withdraw from Afghanistan now, but neither can it sustain the strategy that brought it to this point.” Traditional anti-insurgency tactics, in his view, will not succeed in Afghanistan. Kissinger's argument was not without logic.
The country is too large, the territory too forbidding, the ethnic composition too varied, the population too heavily armed. No foreign conqueror has ever succeeded in occupying Afghanistan. Even attempts to establish centrali-zed Afghan control have rarely succeeded and then not for long. The low standard of living of much of the population has been exacerbated by 30 years of civil war. There is no democratic tradition. Reform may be a moral necessity but it will require decades of peace and security.
It seems the Obama administration is taking Kissinger's advice seriously. It now realises that military strategy should concentrate on preventing the emergence of a contiguous state within the state controlled by jihadists. In practice, this would mean control of Kabul and adjacent Pashtun areas. This would be in line with what Gen. Petraeus has been seeking to pursue to be able to control the 10 percent of Afghan territory where, in his words, 80 percent of the military threat originates. This is the region where the "clear, hold and build" strategy that he had applied with success in Iraq's Anbar province is particularly applicable.
The war in Afghanistan has lasted for too long. It has also been one of the costliest wars, not only for the US and its Nato allies but also for Pakistan which has already staked everything in supporting this war by deploying over 100,000 troops in its tribal areas and along its Afghan border. Pakistan's dilemma today is what if the US does quit the scene as it did after the Soviet pullout in the late 80s. We already fear a spillover of militants as a result of US military operations in Southern Afghanistan with potential to further inflame the troubled province of Balochistan.
Later, his Defense Secretary Robert Gates also gave a similar indication by saying that a political agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban might be acceptable if the insurgents laid down their arms. This reflects a big change in the US thinking. The idea of cooperation with some in the Taliban has been talked about for many months by American military commanders, including Adm Michael Mullen and Gen. Petraeus. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has gone to the extent of stating openly that the war in Afghanistan is a "long-term prospect" which cannot be won in one year, and that American public as well as the troops were pretty tired.
These are clear signals of the changing mood in Washington where plans to get the US forces out of Afghanistan may already be in progress. In February this year, outlining a strategy for Afghanistan, Henry Kissinger had cautioned the Obama administration that it faced dilemmas familiar to several of its predecessors. According to him, the stakes were high, and “America cannot withdraw from Afghanistan now, but neither can it sustain the strategy that brought it to this point.” Traditional anti-insurgency tactics, in his view, will not succeed in Afghanistan. Kissinger's argument was not without logic.
The country is too large, the territory too forbidding, the ethnic composition too varied, the population too heavily armed. No foreign conqueror has ever succeeded in occupying Afghanistan. Even attempts to establish centrali-zed Afghan control have rarely succeeded and then not for long. The low standard of living of much of the population has been exacerbated by 30 years of civil war. There is no democratic tradition. Reform may be a moral necessity but it will require decades of peace and security.
It seems the Obama administration is taking Kissinger's advice seriously. It now realises that military strategy should concentrate on preventing the emergence of a contiguous state within the state controlled by jihadists. In practice, this would mean control of Kabul and adjacent Pashtun areas. This would be in line with what Gen. Petraeus has been seeking to pursue to be able to control the 10 percent of Afghan territory where, in his words, 80 percent of the military threat originates. This is the region where the "clear, hold and build" strategy that he had applied with success in Iraq's Anbar province is particularly applicable.
The war in Afghanistan has lasted for too long. It has also been one of the costliest wars, not only for the US and its Nato allies but also for Pakistan which has already staked everything in supporting this war by deploying over 100,000 troops in its tribal areas and along its Afghan border. Pakistan's dilemma today is what if the US does quit the scene as it did after the Soviet pullout in the late 80s. We already fear a spillover of militants as a result of US military operations in Southern Afghanistan with potential to further inflame the troubled province of Balochistan.
The war in Afghanistan has lasted for too long. It has also been one of the costliest wars, not only for the US and its Nato allies but also for Pakistan which has already staked everything in supporting this war by deploying over 100,000 troops in its tribal areas and along its Afghan border.
This would complicate things for Pakistan which does not have enough troops to deploy in Balochistan to take on the Taliban without denuding its border with India. Already we are suffering the consequences of US insensitivity to Pakistan's legitimate concerns about India's preponderant role in the region especially its nuisance potential in its backyard province of Balochistan. The growing Indo-US nexus in the region at the cost of Pakistan's legitimate geo-strategic interests is also a matter of serious concern for Pakistan.
The people of Pakistan are dis-appointed that non-security aid, contrary to earlier pledges, might be subjected to conditionalities. The drone attacks are also enraging them and fueling anti-American senti-ment. Meanwhile, fulfillment of the promises of market access for Pakistani textiles and for development of “Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZs) in our frontier areas with Afghanistan is nowhere in sight.
The people of Pakistan are dis-appointed that non-security aid, contrary to earlier pledges, might be subjected to conditionalities. The drone attacks are also enraging them and fueling anti-American senti-ment. Meanwhile, fulfillment of the promises of market access for Pakistani textiles and for development of “Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZs) in our frontier areas with Afghanistan is nowhere in sight.
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