It is in its vital interest to have peace and stability in an independent Afghanistan that is friendly towards Pakistan and is free of foreign influences taking advantage of the transition process.
Obama is indeed a miracle man. Getting elected as America's first-ever black president was in itself a miracle, and then becoming a Nobel peace laureate as head of state of a superpower that is tirelessly fighting wars since after the Second World War was even a bigger miracle. His choice as the recipient of the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize was a huge “surprise” even for Obama himself. But he had no qualm in collecting it.
Now that Obama has got rid of Osama, the people in the United States, and indeed the world over, expect him to end the decade-old Afghan war and give them peace. It is time Obama, the miracle man, rose up to the honour that the Nobel Committee had bestowed upon him for doing nothing. In any case, Osama bin Laden was why the United States went to war in Afghanistan, and now that Osama is officially declared dead, Obama is left with no reason or rationale to continue this long and wrong war.
There is already growing public as well as congressional pressure for Obama to speed US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Osama's death comes when Obama was already considering the size and speed of his promised troop drawdown in the increasingly unpopular and costly conflict. It now remains to be seen whether Osama's killing will bring any drastic change in Obama's calculations for an exit strategy.
With his eyes on next year's presidential election for a second term, Obama, no doubt, has been in a fix on the pullout issue and Osama's killing now seems to have given him greater credibility on the issue and perhaps also more space for political maneuvering. It may have provided increased momentum for the war in Afghanistan but Obama would rather capitalize on the event to shrink the US footprint and expense in Afghanistan.
Political thinking in Washington right now is focused on the need for turning the page over from Afghanistan. Senior officials of the administration are already engaged in discussions and strategy sessions about how to leverage the death into a spark that ignites peace talks. They consider Osama's death as the “beginning of the endgame” in Afghanistan. To them, it changes everything and presents an opportunity for reconciliation that didn't exist before.
Though militarist Pentagon-led view is resisting any precipitous move at this stage and urging a more gradual pullout, many of the president's civilian national security advisers contend that the benefits of incremental gains do not merit the cost — in lives and dollars — of such a large military presence. They say negotiations are an essential part of a new war strategy that will allow Obama to announce a substantial reduction in US forces starting this summer.
No wonder, ever since the Osama killing, the Obama administration has been engaged in a holistic reassessment of the war in Afghanistan and the broader effort to combat terrorism, with Congress, the military and the Obama administration weighing the goals, strategies, costs and underlying authority for a conflict that is now almost a decade old. There is little dispute in the White House and among lawmakers that this year has brought 'substantial military gains' against the Taliban.
But assessments of the other elements of the strategy — such as improving the Afghan economy and the government in ways that can sustain hard-won security — are less positive. There are serious doubts on the feasibility of plans to recruit and train as many as 400,000 Afghan security forces to take over once foreign troops depart. “Despite our best efforts, there are challenges of corruption, predatory behaviour, incompetence still evident within the Afghan army and police,” Senator John Kerry said at a recent hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he chairs.
On top of these problems, there is also the question, ultimately, of money and resources. The annual cost of maintaining the Afghan forces is estimated at up to $10 billion, whereas Afghan tax revenue totals less than $2 billion leaving a huge gap to be filled by American taxpayer. “So who will pay the bills to avoid having those armed soldiers and police mobilised as part of the next insurgency?” Kerry asked. He also questioned what he described a “fundamentally unsustainable” monthly expenditure of more than $10 billion on a massive military operation with no end in sight, and called for urgent clarification from the administration on its mission and exit plan.
Kerry summed up the whole issue in one question: “What is the political solution? We need to make our ultimate goals absolutely clear for the sake of the American people, Afghans, Pakistanis and everyone else who has a stake in the outcome,” he said. This question says it all. No one knows what the political solution is going to be for ending this unwinnable costly war which has not gone beyond retribution and retaliation.
With his eyes on next year's presidential election for a second term, Obama, no doubt, has been in a fix on the pullout issue and Osama's killing now seems to have given him greater credibility on the issue and perhaps also more space for political maneuvering.
No wonder people in the US and allied European countries are sick of this conflict and want their troops to be out of the war theatre. Even before bin Laden's killing, America's cumulative problems at home with growing economic costs of the Afghan war, the continuing national debt crisis, the upcoming 2012 presidential election, and “realities” on the ground had bolstered arguments that the plans to remake Afghanistan's government and economy went too far beyond the goal of safeguarding US security.
Influential Senators like John Kerry and Richard Lugar, both ranking leaders of their parties in the Senate are looking for a political solution in Afghanistan. Kerry looks at Osama's killing as potentially a “game-changing” opportunity to build momentum for a political solution in Afghanistan that could also bring greater stability to the region as well as ultimately enable the allies to bring their troops home.
After weeks of debate among civilian and military leaders, the US National Security Council recently endorsed key elements of the State Department's reconciliation strategy. Starting peace talks has now become the top priority for Marc Grossman, the US government's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. He was in Pakistan earlier this month for the first meeting of a “core group” that Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US have constituted to promote and facilitate the process of reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan.
Speaking of reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan, it is important that the transition process does not ignore the unchangeable Afghan reality that the Afghans have a fierce sense of independence, and have never been pacified by foreign forces. The post-Soviet chaos and the post-9/11 US-led military campaign both have only deepened the Afghan ethnic divide. The experience of centuries, especially of the last two decades, should make one thing abundantly clear. No reconciliation imposed from outside will work in Afghanistan, and no exit strategy will succeed by further deepening the ethnic divide in this war-torn country.
Henry Kissinger understands the Afghan phenomenon in its true character by admitting that Afghanistan is a nation, not a state in the conventional sense. In his view, any exit strategy must be based on the historic reality that the writ of the Afghan government has traditionally been confined to Kabul and its environs, leaving the rest of the country to be run by local warlords or tribal influentials as almost semi-autonomous regions configured largely on the basis of ethnicity, dealing with each other by tacit or explicit understandings.
Historically, for reasons of its difficult geography and multiple ethnicities, the country has rarely been able to achieve a strong central government. Now to expect President Hamid Karzai to create a modern central government within a given timeframe is not realistic. Given the structure of his society based on personal affinities and tribal traditions, the demand for him to deliver in matter of months is beyond his capacity. The country is too large, the ethnic composition too varied, and the population too heavily armed. No army or police force without genuinely reflecting the ethnic reality can deliver in this scenario.
Another lesson from history is that no military occupation for an indefinite period has ever worked. Also different theatres of war require different approaches. Iraq's "Marjah” or “Anbar" blueprints will not work in Afghanistan. General Petraeus must understand that any plan that precipitates intra-Afghan conflict as part of his anti-Taliban strategy will seriously jeopardise the reconciliation process and throw this ill-fated country in another fratricidal civil war. It would be a dangerous mistake which will not be without grave implications for both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The historic, cultural and demographic architectures of Afghanistan cannot be altered through military operations. The transition arrangement, therefore, must not be weighted in favour or against any particular ethnic group. Durable peace in Afghanistan will come only through reconciliation of all Afghan factions with no selectivity or exclusivity. The US already recognizes the Taliban as part of the Afghan “political fabric” and has said that it would be ready to negotiate with them.
In a speech in February this year that elicited little attention because of events in the Middle East, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had articulated a new stance for negotiations with the Taliban. The benchmarks for the Taliban to renounce violence, break with al-Qaeda or embrace the Afghan constitution are no longer preconditions for talks; now those terms only have to be “necessary outcomes of any negotiation.”
Durable peace in Afghanistan will in particular remain elusive as long as Pakistan's legitimate security concerns in the region remain unaddressed. Pakistan has staked everything in support of peace in Afghanistan, and is constantly paying a heavy price in terms of violence, massive displacement, trade and production slowdown, export stagnation, investor hesitation and a worsening law and order situation. It is also suffering the consequences of US insensitivity to Pakistan's legitimate concerns about India's preponderant role in the region, especially its nuisance potential in its backyard.
The US may have its own political compulsions in the run-up to next year's presidential election but both Afghanistan and Pakistan have suffered for too long and cannot afford another cataclysm. The effectiveness of their role and capability in this process will suffer if other conflicts and disputes continue to engage and divert their attention and resources.
Whatever the endgame, on its part, Pakistan has direct stakes in Afghan peace, and despite the Abbottabad fiasco, it has an indispensable role to play in any Afghan-led reconciliation and negotiating processes. It is in its vital interest to have peace and stability in an independent Afghanistan that is friendly towards Pakistan and is free of foreign influences taking advantage of the transition process.
Influential Senators like John Kerry and Richard Lugar, both ranking leaders of their parties in the Senate are looking for a political solution in Afghanistan. Kerry looks at Osama's killing as potentially a “game-changing” opportunity to build momentum for a political solution in Afghanistan that could also bring greater stability to the region as well as ultimately enable the allies to bring their troops home.
After weeks of debate among civilian and military leaders, the US National Security Council recently endorsed key elements of the State Department's reconciliation strategy. Starting peace talks has now become the top priority for Marc Grossman, the US government's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. He was in Pakistan earlier this month for the first meeting of a “core group” that Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US have constituted to promote and facilitate the process of reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan.
Speaking of reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan, it is important that the transition process does not ignore the unchangeable Afghan reality that the Afghans have a fierce sense of independence, and have never been pacified by foreign forces. The post-Soviet chaos and the post-9/11 US-led military campaign both have only deepened the Afghan ethnic divide. The experience of centuries, especially of the last two decades, should make one thing abundantly clear. No reconciliation imposed from outside will work in Afghanistan, and no exit strategy will succeed by further deepening the ethnic divide in this war-torn country.
Henry Kissinger understands the Afghan phenomenon in its true character by admitting that Afghanistan is a nation, not a state in the conventional sense. In his view, any exit strategy must be based on the historic reality that the writ of the Afghan government has traditionally been confined to Kabul and its environs, leaving the rest of the country to be run by local warlords or tribal influentials as almost semi-autonomous regions configured largely on the basis of ethnicity, dealing with each other by tacit or explicit understandings.
Historically, for reasons of its difficult geography and multiple ethnicities, the country has rarely been able to achieve a strong central government. Now to expect President Hamid Karzai to create a modern central government within a given timeframe is not realistic. Given the structure of his society based on personal affinities and tribal traditions, the demand for him to deliver in matter of months is beyond his capacity. The country is too large, the ethnic composition too varied, and the population too heavily armed. No army or police force without genuinely reflecting the ethnic reality can deliver in this scenario.
Another lesson from history is that no military occupation for an indefinite period has ever worked. Also different theatres of war require different approaches. Iraq's "Marjah” or “Anbar" blueprints will not work in Afghanistan. General Petraeus must understand that any plan that precipitates intra-Afghan conflict as part of his anti-Taliban strategy will seriously jeopardise the reconciliation process and throw this ill-fated country in another fratricidal civil war. It would be a dangerous mistake which will not be without grave implications for both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The historic, cultural and demographic architectures of Afghanistan cannot be altered through military operations. The transition arrangement, therefore, must not be weighted in favour or against any particular ethnic group. Durable peace in Afghanistan will come only through reconciliation of all Afghan factions with no selectivity or exclusivity. The US already recognizes the Taliban as part of the Afghan “political fabric” and has said that it would be ready to negotiate with them.
In a speech in February this year that elicited little attention because of events in the Middle East, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had articulated a new stance for negotiations with the Taliban. The benchmarks for the Taliban to renounce violence, break with al-Qaeda or embrace the Afghan constitution are no longer preconditions for talks; now those terms only have to be “necessary outcomes of any negotiation.”
Durable peace in Afghanistan will in particular remain elusive as long as Pakistan's legitimate security concerns in the region remain unaddressed. Pakistan has staked everything in support of peace in Afghanistan, and is constantly paying a heavy price in terms of violence, massive displacement, trade and production slowdown, export stagnation, investor hesitation and a worsening law and order situation. It is also suffering the consequences of US insensitivity to Pakistan's legitimate concerns about India's preponderant role in the region, especially its nuisance potential in its backyard.
The US may have its own political compulsions in the run-up to next year's presidential election but both Afghanistan and Pakistan have suffered for too long and cannot afford another cataclysm. The effectiveness of their role and capability in this process will suffer if other conflicts and disputes continue to engage and divert their attention and resources.
Whatever the endgame, on its part, Pakistan has direct stakes in Afghan peace, and despite the Abbottabad fiasco, it has an indispensable role to play in any Afghan-led reconciliation and negotiating processes. It is in its vital interest to have peace and stability in an independent Afghanistan that is friendly towards Pakistan and is free of foreign influences taking advantage of the transition process.
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