The world remains focused on a host of other issues while the dream of a nuclear-weapon free world is becoming more and more elusive.
CHINA'S VISION OF WORLD POWER
Tuesday, June 01, 2010
Tuesday, June 01, 2010
The 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is currently taking place in New York almost as a global non-event. The world remains focused on a host of other issues while the dream of a nuclear-weapon free world is becoming more and more elusive. There are deep differences between the nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states over a myriad of issues, especially nuclear disarmament.
Since the NPT came into force in 1970, the five yearly review conferences have been taking place to assess the implementation of the treaty’s provisions and to make ‘recommendations on measures to further strengthen it.’ In the first four review conferences, the most noteworthy common feature was the disillusionment of the non-nuclear parties with what they considered the failure of the three nuclear parties, namely the US, UK and the Soviet Union to live up to their treaty obligations.
Article VI of NPT obligates all signatory parties to the Treaty “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control.” The Preamble of the Treaty contains a similar undertaking on the part of all signatory parties.
The three nuclear parties were then viewed clearly in breach of their obligation to implement NPT’s Article VI and the Preamble which are aimed primarily at preventing ‘vertical’ proliferation. The nuclear powers were more interested in reducing the risks of ‘horizontal’ proliferation and pursued their own non-proliferation agenda in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner with scant commitment to the overarching goal of a nuclear weapon-free world.
Twenty-five years after NPT’s entry into force, as mandated in Article X, a conference of the state parties was held to decide whether the Treaty shall be extended indefinitely or for an additional fixed period or periods. Accordingly, in 1995, the state parties at a conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The non-nuclear states agreed to this extension only after the nuclear weapon states assured them of continued avowal of their obligation to pursue the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
After the treaty’s indefinite extension, the 2000 RevCon was the first occasion for soul-searching and an opportunity to the state parties to reflect and find as to what went wrong in realization of the NPT objectives. The non-nuclear states wanted clearer commitment from the nuclear weapon states to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They also defined 13 steps to serve as benchmarks of their progress in this direction. The nuclear weapon states, once again as a ritual, undertook to pursue the goal of “total elimination” of their nuclear arsenals.
Like the earlier review conferences, the current 2010 RevCon is not likely go beyond the usual rhetoric. In recent years, the agendas to NPT conferences have remained an inconsequential procedural matter involving hotly disputed and politicized issues. For most governments, the composition of the agenda has been a subject of political value. At the 2005 RevCon, no substantive discussions could begin for almost three weeks due to disputes over the agenda. A key sticking point is the 2000 RevCon mandate for review of the treaty taking into account the decisions and resolution adopted in 1995.
Since the NPT came into force in 1970, the five yearly review conferences have been taking place to assess the implementation of the treaty’s provisions and to make ‘recommendations on measures to further strengthen it.’ In the first four review conferences, the most noteworthy common feature was the disillusionment of the non-nuclear parties with what they considered the failure of the three nuclear parties, namely the US, UK and the Soviet Union to live up to their treaty obligations.
Article VI of NPT obligates all signatory parties to the Treaty “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control.” The Preamble of the Treaty contains a similar undertaking on the part of all signatory parties.
The three nuclear parties were then viewed clearly in breach of their obligation to implement NPT’s Article VI and the Preamble which are aimed primarily at preventing ‘vertical’ proliferation. The nuclear powers were more interested in reducing the risks of ‘horizontal’ proliferation and pursued their own non-proliferation agenda in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner with scant commitment to the overarching goal of a nuclear weapon-free world.
Twenty-five years after NPT’s entry into force, as mandated in Article X, a conference of the state parties was held to decide whether the Treaty shall be extended indefinitely or for an additional fixed period or periods. Accordingly, in 1995, the state parties at a conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The non-nuclear states agreed to this extension only after the nuclear weapon states assured them of continued avowal of their obligation to pursue the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
After the treaty’s indefinite extension, the 2000 RevCon was the first occasion for soul-searching and an opportunity to the state parties to reflect and find as to what went wrong in realization of the NPT objectives. The non-nuclear states wanted clearer commitment from the nuclear weapon states to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They also defined 13 steps to serve as benchmarks of their progress in this direction. The nuclear weapon states, once again as a ritual, undertook to pursue the goal of “total elimination” of their nuclear arsenals.
Like the earlier review conferences, the current 2010 RevCon is not likely go beyond the usual rhetoric. In recent years, the agendas to NPT conferences have remained an inconsequential procedural matter involving hotly disputed and politicized issues. For most governments, the composition of the agenda has been a subject of political value. At the 2005 RevCon, no substantive discussions could begin for almost three weeks due to disputes over the agenda. A key sticking point is the 2000 RevCon mandate for review of the treaty taking into account the decisions and resolution adopted in 1995.
The success of the 2010 RevCon in New York will depend on whether the nuclear weapon-states would still agree to certain new elements in the context of Article VI of the NPT. These include their unequivocal commitment to accomplishing total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, acceptance of the principle of irreversibility vis-à-vis nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control measures, voluntary transparency in terms of their nuclear weapon capability and implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI, further reduction of non-strategic nuclear (tactical) weapons, and measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons.
Woefully, the current global nuclear order inspires no confidence in the non-proliferation agenda which is being followed in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner If global disarmament is beyond reach today, it is only because the multilateral system is being used to legitimise the strategic and security set-up for a few. There has been a progressive erosion of genuine will towards disarmament as witnessed in the unifocal, self-serving non-proliferation policies of the key powers, violation of treaty obligations and the weakening of UN disarmament institutions.
The last session of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament is a case in point, where an attempt was made yet again to bulldoze a selective and preferential agenda rather than adopt an integrated approach to holistically address the four core issues identified as the crucial elements of nuclear disarmament. As a result, the consensus underpinning disarmament and non-proliferation has weakened. There are clear differences of perspective, approach and modalities among states to promote international and regional peace and security through disarmament and non-proliferation.
Woefully, the current global nuclear order inspires no confidence in the non-proliferation agenda which is being followed in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner If global disarmament is beyond reach today, it is only because the multilateral system is being used to legitimise the strategic and security set-up for a few. There has been a progressive erosion of genuine will towards disarmament as witnessed in the unifocal, self-serving non-proliferation policies of the key powers, violation of treaty obligations and the weakening of UN disarmament institutions.
The last session of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament is a case in point, where an attempt was made yet again to bulldoze a selective and preferential agenda rather than adopt an integrated approach to holistically address the four core issues identified as the crucial elements of nuclear disarmament. As a result, the consensus underpinning disarmament and non-proliferation has weakened. There are clear differences of perspective, approach and modalities among states to promote international and regional peace and security through disarmament and non-proliferation.
If global disarmament is beyond reach today, it is only because the multilateral system is being used to legitimise the strategic and security setup for a few. Ironically, their own huge nuclear stockpiles do not seem to prevent the nuclear powers from demanding that the rest of the world refrain from attempts to join the nuclear club, or be subject to punitive measures, a situation that amounts to telling people not to smoke while you have a cigarette dangling from your mouth.
Lack of progress in the resolution of long-standing regional disputes, emergence of new forms of conflicts, which emanate from power asymmetries, as well as economic and social disparities and injustices, continue to obstruct the objective of equal security for all. In addition to horizontal and vertical proliferation of WMDs at state level, the threat of acquisition and use of WMDs by non-state actors has become a growing concern. An attempt is also being made to “redefine” the whole nuclear issue by shifting the focus from nuclear disarmament to nuclear terrorism.
The new focus was reinforced at the nuclear security summit hosted by US President Barack Obama in Washington last month. No one disputes the gravity and immediacy of the nuclear terrorist threat to global security. One hopes the global strategy emerging from the Washington summit will be implemented on a time-bound basis "to secure vulnerable nuclear materials, break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt illicit trade in nuclear materials."
But this strategy will not be a substitute to the overarching goal of a nuclear-weapon free world. Unless the nuclear weapon states change their view of global security, there is no prospect for a global consensus on disarmament in pursuit of a nuclear weapon-free world. President Obama has himself been calling for such a world. He is surely echoing the global sentiment. But he knows the reality and admitted that he may not live long enough to see a nuclear-free world, and that the US will maintain a nuclear arsenal "as long as these weapons exist."
The end of the Cold War had provided an opportunity to revert to the concept of collective security, engendering hopes that peace would no longer remain hostage to antagonistic, heavily militarised blocs. But today tens of thousands of nuclear weapons still remain in arsenals around the world. Together the US and Russia alone possess more than 95 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons.
The situation has been aggravated by the burgeoning arms trade and country-specific discriminatory supply of nuclear fuel and technology by some of the major nuclear powers. Discriminatory and short-sighted policies providing selective access to nuclear technology for narrow gains in disregard of equitably applicable criteria-based approach have further undermined the international non-proliferation regime and detract from its credibility and legitimacy. These selective country-specific arrangements are likely to facilitate diversion of nuclear material for military purposes.
Undue restrictions on the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, a right guaranteed under Article IV, only serve to strengthen the monopoly of few over nuclear technology while forcing others to look for ways outside the Treaty. Such discrimination is dangerous for the integrity of the regime.
The new focus was reinforced at the nuclear security summit hosted by US President Barack Obama in Washington last month. No one disputes the gravity and immediacy of the nuclear terrorist threat to global security. One hopes the global strategy emerging from the Washington summit will be implemented on a time-bound basis "to secure vulnerable nuclear materials, break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt illicit trade in nuclear materials."
But this strategy will not be a substitute to the overarching goal of a nuclear-weapon free world. Unless the nuclear weapon states change their view of global security, there is no prospect for a global consensus on disarmament in pursuit of a nuclear weapon-free world. President Obama has himself been calling for such a world. He is surely echoing the global sentiment. But he knows the reality and admitted that he may not live long enough to see a nuclear-free world, and that the US will maintain a nuclear arsenal "as long as these weapons exist."
The end of the Cold War had provided an opportunity to revert to the concept of collective security, engendering hopes that peace would no longer remain hostage to antagonistic, heavily militarised blocs. But today tens of thousands of nuclear weapons still remain in arsenals around the world. Together the US and Russia alone possess more than 95 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons.
The situation has been aggravated by the burgeoning arms trade and country-specific discriminatory supply of nuclear fuel and technology by some of the major nuclear powers. Discriminatory and short-sighted policies providing selective access to nuclear technology for narrow gains in disregard of equitably applicable criteria-based approach have further undermined the international non-proliferation regime and detract from its credibility and legitimacy. These selective country-specific arrangements are likely to facilitate diversion of nuclear material for military purposes.
Undue restrictions on the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, a right guaranteed under Article IV, only serve to strengthen the monopoly of few over nuclear technology while forcing others to look for ways outside the Treaty. Such discrimination is dangerous for the integrity of the regime.
Unless the NPT regime is reconciled to the nuclear reality and the three de facto nuclear states are incorporated into the non-proliferation regime, there will remain a gaping hole in the NPT regime.
India’s former external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh had rightly called for an end to “nuclear apartheid.”
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
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