As Viceroy of India, Mountbatten was responsible for maintaining law and order in the country and controlling violence, bloodshed and rioting. But after taking the decision on August 9 and 12, he gave up all such responsibilities.
The concealment of Punjab Award was indeed an act of treachery on the part of Lord Mountbatten. By doing so, he deliberately deceived the governor of Punjab Mr. Jenkins and the members of the Punjab Partition Committee, and did not fulfil the promises he himself had made to them. He showed the same insincere and treacherous attitude to the leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League by not telling them that he had secretly made up his mind to cover up the details of the Punjab Award. Moreover, he was disloyal even to the members of Prime Minister Attlee’s cabinet and did not let them know two very important points. Firstly, he had unanimously agreed with the staff members to publish the Award as soon as possible, because, it would reduce the risk of lawlessness. Secondly, he deviated from the earlier consensus and decided to conceal the Award and defer its publication till August 15. Furthermore, he completely set aside the assurance which he had given to Maulana Azad. He himself had pledged that after the approval of partition, he would not allow any type of bloodshed and rioting in the country; and in case riots broke out, he would crush the rioters by using tanks and air craft. But contrary to his commitments, after the preparation of the Award, he sat idly for the next five days, although it was crystal clear that the delay of each day was substantially increasing the danger of riots and violence in the country. This attitude certainly amounted to treachery with Maulana Azad, Congress and Punjab.
Mountbatten refused to take into confidence the cabinet of Prime Minister Attlee about the motives behind his decision to cover up the Punjab Award and postpone its publication. It can be concluded from his attitude that he was apprehensive that the cabinet would reject his decision and instruct him to use his wide ranging powers to control the violence whose eruption he was anticipating after the publication of the report. He knew that he could get whatever he demanded from the cabinet. But he also knew that in certain matters, he could not mould the cabinet according to his desires. For instance, he had come under a great deal of pressure from the Congress to grant dominion status to the interim government but Attlee’s cabinet remained unmoved because, acceding to the demands of the Congress meant injustice with the Muslims. The cabinet provided full backing to Mountbatten so that he could suppress the violence, because Attlee and his cabinet did not have the least desire to tarnish the last chapter of British rule over India with the episodes of unnecessary bloodshed and unwanted injustice.
Both Maulana Azad and Mosley hold Mountbatten responsible for the sufferings of the people of Punjab in the wake of the partition of India. Referring to the assurances of Mountbatten, Maulana Azad writes, “The whole world knows what happened after the bold announcement of Mountbatten
The partition of the country was followed by widespread bloodshed and massacres all across the country, in which innocent men, women and children were brutally murdered. The army had also been divided and, therefore, effective steps were not taken to protect the Hindus and Muslims from the massacre.
For this reason I have written in the previous chapter of the book that Wavell had said the right thing.”
In the same way, Mosley writes, “In the times to come, only those who have worked in India and those who live in India and love it, will think that the final days of British rule in India are stained with immense bloodshed.”
When these words were being written, Mosley and Maulana Azad did not have access to Mountbatten’s papers and the documents lying in India office because, volume 12 of Transfer of Power was published long after the publication of their books. If they had seen the documents included in volume 12, their condemnation and criticism of Mountbatten would surely have become much stronger and forceful. As Viceroy of India, Mountbatten was responsible for maintaining law and order in the country and controlling violence, bloodshed and rioting. But after taking the decision on August 9 and 12, he gave up all such responsibilities.
Aisha Jalal, in her book has remarked that when Punjab was writhing miserably under the influence of the decisions made in far off regions, Mountbatten was boldly demanding for himself the credit of accomplishing the greatest administrative operation in the human history within a period of less than two and a half months. On behalf of the hundreds of thousands of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs who were massacred in the process and hundreds of thousands of refugees who were helplessly staggering between the two states, it is the responsibility of the historians to challenge Mountbatten’s claim and ask him whether it was a grand operation or a shameful escape.
Aisha Jalal has stated that she had mainly depended on the eleven volumes of Transfer of Power which had been published till that time. But she did not analyze the documents related to Radcliffe’s Punjab Award, because these documents are included in volume 12 of Transfer of power which was published after the publication of Aisha’s book. The shameful escape mentioned by Aisha Jalal has deep roots. Since 1858, India had been ruled by the Viceroys who had acted as the representatives of the British government. In this capacity, they had always been responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the country. For the same purpose,
In the same way, Mosley writes, “In the times to come, only those who have worked in India and those who live in India and love it, will think that the final days of British rule in India are stained with immense bloodshed.”
When these words were being written, Mosley and Maulana Azad did not have access to Mountbatten’s papers and the documents lying in India office because, volume 12 of Transfer of Power was published long after the publication of their books. If they had seen the documents included in volume 12, their condemnation and criticism of Mountbatten would surely have become much stronger and forceful. As Viceroy of India, Mountbatten was responsible for maintaining law and order in the country and controlling violence, bloodshed and rioting. But after taking the decision on August 9 and 12, he gave up all such responsibilities.
Aisha Jalal, in her book has remarked that when Punjab was writhing miserably under the influence of the decisions made in far off regions, Mountbatten was boldly demanding for himself the credit of accomplishing the greatest administrative operation in the human history within a period of less than two and a half months. On behalf of the hundreds of thousands of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs who were massacred in the process and hundreds of thousands of refugees who were helplessly staggering between the two states, it is the responsibility of the historians to challenge Mountbatten’s claim and ask him whether it was a grand operation or a shameful escape.
Aisha Jalal has stated that she had mainly depended on the eleven volumes of Transfer of Power which had been published till that time. But she did not analyze the documents related to Radcliffe’s Punjab Award, because these documents are included in volume 12 of Transfer of power which was published after the publication of Aisha’s book. The shameful escape mentioned by Aisha Jalal has deep roots. Since 1858, India had been ruled by the Viceroys who had acted as the representatives of the British government. In this capacity, they had always been responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the country. For the same purpose,
Mountbatten had also been given wide ranging powers, but quite deliberately, Mountbatten himself got rid of this responsibility through a decision on August 9. He placed this responsibility on the shoulders of the inexperienced leaders of divided India.
Mountbatten was the most prominent figure in the grand and glorious ceremonial receptions, feasts and parties which were held on August 14 and 15. Whatever he did between August 9 and 15, was kept secret by the members of his staff. This secret remained a secret till 1999 and it would have remained so even afterwards, if British Prime Minister Harold Wilson had not taken some action in this regard. Even then, it took another 35 years for the truth to be fully exposed.
The tragic events associated with the partition of India had left deep marks on the mind of Mountbatten. They can be guessed from the efforts made by him to justify his actions. While making all such efforts, he was sure that his direct responsibility in this tragedy was a secret and would remain so till the end of his life. Thus, on his return to England from India in 1948, he claimed that the interim period had been relatively peaceful. As a proof of his claim, he argued that only three per cent of the population was involved in the unrest and rioting. Commenting on it, Brecher wrote, “Per centage and numbers are often misleading. But even then, if we view the matter from the point of view of the number of human beings, it means that ten million people or one in thirty-five persons were involved in violence. It is difficult to say whether delay is destructive or not because, we cannot turn back the clock of history. However, it is sufficient to say that a large number of Indians, Pakistanis and Britishers are of the opinion that if the transfer of power had been delayed, the situation would not have been worse than what it was.
Mountbatten told Mosley that the Indians were not concerned about anything except freedom. The answer is clear. There were other things as well, about which the Indians were concerned. Jinnah, Nehru and other leaders had fought in the war of independence not because they wanted to display or witness horror and terror, nor did they wish that the relations between the two states should remain tense for several years as a result of these horrifying events. Anyhow, Mountbatten was aware of his role in the transfer of power and the subsequent tragic events. Now that the facts have come to light, we can only say that his actions cannot be defended.
The tragic events associated with the partition of India had left deep marks on the mind of Mountbatten. They can be guessed from the efforts made by him to justify his actions. While making all such efforts, he was sure that his direct responsibility in this tragedy was a secret and would remain so till the end of his life. Thus, on his return to England from India in 1948, he claimed that the interim period had been relatively peaceful. As a proof of his claim, he argued that only three per cent of the population was involved in the unrest and rioting. Commenting on it, Brecher wrote, “Per centage and numbers are often misleading. But even then, if we view the matter from the point of view of the number of human beings, it means that ten million people or one in thirty-five persons were involved in violence. It is difficult to say whether delay is destructive or not because, we cannot turn back the clock of history. However, it is sufficient to say that a large number of Indians, Pakistanis and Britishers are of the opinion that if the transfer of power had been delayed, the situation would not have been worse than what it was.
Mountbatten told Mosley that the Indians were not concerned about anything except freedom. The answer is clear. There were other things as well, about which the Indians were concerned. Jinnah, Nehru and other leaders had fought in the war of independence not because they wanted to display or witness horror and terror, nor did they wish that the relations between the two states should remain tense for several years as a result of these horrifying events. Anyhow, Mountbatten was aware of his role in the transfer of power and the subsequent tragic events. Now that the facts have come to light, we can only say that his actions cannot be defended.
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