The 9/11 incident restructured international politics and thereafter it occupied a centre-stage in conducting interstate relations. Pakistan due to its geo-strategic location and having diplomatic ties with Afghanistan, who was immediately labelled as a sanctuary of the terrorists headed by Osama bin laden, Pakistan was bound to be frazzled in days ahead.
It is often argued that Pakistan’s post 9/11 shift in foreign policy was an impulsive decision that precluded a comprehensive forethought before extending an unconditional cooperation with the US and making a U-Turn in our approach towards the Taliban’s Government. The purpose of this article is to establish that the decision to join the War on Terror (WOT) was the most appropriate among the available options and was generally, if not entirely, in National Interest. However, how we could have utilized the available opportunities to maximize our win-set is open for further debate and intellectual research.
“The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre & the Pentagon”, argued Mr. Abdul Sattar, the then Foreign Minister, in his book ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy’ “triggered a transformation of world Politics.” Those never-imagined and devastating attacks on the US mainland traumatized the entire country and filled her with anger and urge for revenge. Within no time, almost all the countries of the world condemned the despicable acts of terrorism, including Pakistan. This event restructured international politics because terrorism was unanimously identified as the biggest threat to humanity and thereafter it occupied a centre-stage in conducting interstate relations.
Due to its geo-strategic location, its contiguity with Afghanistan, and one of the three countries having diplomatic ties with her, who was immediately labelled as a sanctuary of the terrorists headed by Osama bin laden, Pakistan was bound to be frazzled in days ahead. Within few days, the clairvoyance of Pakistani foreign policy and security experts was justified when it was given a proverbial Hobson’s choice in the words of President Bush:
“Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”
Since there was no middle way, therefore Pakistan had to choose either of the following two choices:
1. To exigently Join the US in Principle and workout the modalities later on
2. To refuse to submit in clear defiance and be ready for a war
In his book, In The Line Of Fire, Former President Musharraf mentions that his first reaction after being threatened to ‘be sent back to the stone-age’ was to order our valiant armed forces to war-game the U.S but later on, when better sense prevailed and the overwhelming disproportionateness of power difference was calculated, it was decided to toe-in-line with the onerous demands of the U.S. Those demands were as follow:
1. To stop Al Qaeda operations at its border
2. To give blanket overflight and landing rights for military operations
3. To provide Intelligence information
4. To provide territorial access to allied forces
5. To continue to publicly condemn the terrorists acts
6. To sever ties with the Taliban, if the refuse to cooperate
7. To cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan
Before calculating, the costs and the benefits of any decision, keep in mind the following details:
1. Within 24 hrs of the attacks, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 that authorized the use of force against the perpetrators, organizers and the sponsors of those terrorist strikes.
2. NATO, for the first time in its history, invoked Art 5 (Joint defence).
3. Pakistan’s economy was in shambles and it was on the verge of being declared, a failed state.
4. Different sanctions were already imposed on Pakistan such as:
a. Pressler Ammendment: Enacted in 1985 and imposed in 1990. The president had the power to ease the sanctions and for that, he had to testify each year before giving aid, in front of congress, that Pakistan was not pursing the Nuclear Weapons which he did till 1990 (until the Afghan-war was ended).
b. Glenn Amendment: it was for those Non-Nuclear member states that detonate nuclear devices; a modern version of Pressler Ammendent.
c. Democracy Sanctions: For the Military coup in 1999
Now in this context, let us estimate the impact in case we had gone for the second option i.e. the cost of non-cooperation. In that case, we had to pay the following price:
1. The U.S might have bracketed Pakistan with the Taliban while declaring Pakistan a terrorist state.
2. Our territory would have surely been subjected to furious onslaughts and airstrikes to neutralize resistance under the pretext of eliminating terrorist bases.
3. The Kashmiri freedom struggle might (read ‘surely’) have been labelled as a terrorist insurgency.
4. India would have been given a green signal to attack kahuta (KRL) as it had pondered such an attack in 1980s.
5. Even, despite all odds that were stacked against us, if we had managed to put up a descent resistance and offered awe-inspiring sacrifices, what would have been the net result? Was that a justified cost of a decision based on idealism and not on the principles of international law, exigencies of time, and pragmatism?
Before saying an obvious ‘No’ to this lopsided option that was fraught with suicidal course, let us also examine the path that was selected. As far as the compliance of the demands of the U.S is concerned, Pakistan did not have to make substantial concessions to the USA, as a couple of requests required no actions:
c. Democracy Sanctions: For the Military coup in 1999
Now in this context, let us estimate the impact in case we had gone for the second option i.e. the cost of non-cooperation. In that case, we had to pay the following price:
1. The U.S might have bracketed Pakistan with the Taliban while declaring Pakistan a terrorist state.
2. Our territory would have surely been subjected to furious onslaughts and airstrikes to neutralize resistance under the pretext of eliminating terrorist bases.
3. The Kashmiri freedom struggle might (read ‘surely’) have been labelled as a terrorist insurgency.
4. India would have been given a green signal to attack kahuta (KRL) as it had pondered such an attack in 1980s.
5. Even, despite all odds that were stacked against us, if we had managed to put up a descent resistance and offered awe-inspiring sacrifices, what would have been the net result? Was that a justified cost of a decision based on idealism and not on the principles of international law, exigencies of time, and pragmatism?
Before saying an obvious ‘No’ to this lopsided option that was fraught with suicidal course, let us also examine the path that was selected. As far as the compliance of the demands of the U.S is concerned, Pakistan did not have to make substantial concessions to the USA, as a couple of requests required no actions:
Pakistan had already condemned the terrorist attacks and it had not provided logistic access to Bin Laden. Some misguided Imams in the border areas misled the fragile youth, in the name or Religion, to join the Taliban but that was never approved or encouraged by the Government.
Therefore, Pakistan had to make only a few concessions such as providing logistics etc that it gleefully did.
The then president successfully adopted public diplomacy by addressing the nation on 19th October in which he stated that he was taking this decision to forestall the possibility of earlier mentioned threats. In this way he managed to contract the win-set of US because he excluded the Missile and nuclear assets, and the Kashmir cause, from the agenda of impending negotiations and included safe guard against the ‘external’ threat (read ‘Indian’) in it.
“Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary”
-President Musharraf
19th Sep 2001
The main benefits that this decision accrued were:
1. On 22 September, the Military and the Economic sanctions were lifted that were imposed under Pressler, Symington and Glenn amendments and under Sec 508 of Foreign Assistance ACT.
2. All the outstanding debts were rescheduled and inflow of fresh economic aid, started which reinvigorated the economy.
3. Pakistan started receiving new military hardware including the F-16’s.
4. U.S generously donated during the post-quake crisis.
5. Pakistan’s standing at international forum was improved and its role as a ‘Front line state in the WOT’ received wide spread accolades and kudos. After that enlightened decision, Pakistan was visited by numerous Leaders of international stature like UK’s Premier Mr. Tony Blair, Netherlands Premier Mr. Wim Kokj, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Belgium Premier Mr. Guy Verhofstadt and many others, one on the heel of the other.
6. Bilateral relations with the U.S improved tremendously and on long term basis unlike on-again, off-again like relations in the past.
7. The world became aware of the sufferings of the people of Afghanistan.
“Appreciating Pakistan’s key role as a ‘frontline State’ in the war on terrorism, the U.S, the EU and Japan dismantled nuclear and democracy sanctions and resumed assistance to Pakistan.”
-Dr. Abdul Sattar
Former Foreign Minister in “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy”
Therefore, after critically analyzing the pros and cons of the decision it is clear that Pakistan had timely made an apropos decision. Though in our short but tremulous history, our country has swerved from one crisis to another mostly due to unavoidable circumstances but it has never faced such a more excruciating dilemma. In retrospective analysis, it can be argued that had there been a mature and stable political setup in Pakistan at that time, it would have enabled Pakistan to broaden its win-set. The delay that is inherent in the decision making process in a political setup would have worked in favour of Pakistan and would have improved its bargaining chips. Moreover, anfractuous events do happen but the most important thing is to wisely elicit the lessons from such crises. It has almost become a fashion to vociferously deplore an ‘external factor’ (read ‘Amreeka’) for our own shortcomings. It doesn’t mean that the cost that we are paying as a nation in this war is equivalent to the benefits that we have reaped. Of course, the cost far outweighs the benefits but instead of bursting into pointless polemics, we have to seek the reasons in visceral introspection.
The then president successfully adopted public diplomacy by addressing the nation on 19th October in which he stated that he was taking this decision to forestall the possibility of earlier mentioned threats. In this way he managed to contract the win-set of US because he excluded the Missile and nuclear assets, and the Kashmir cause, from the agenda of impending negotiations and included safe guard against the ‘external’ threat (read ‘Indian’) in it.
“Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary”
-President Musharraf
19th Sep 2001
The main benefits that this decision accrued were:
1. On 22 September, the Military and the Economic sanctions were lifted that were imposed under Pressler, Symington and Glenn amendments and under Sec 508 of Foreign Assistance ACT.
2. All the outstanding debts were rescheduled and inflow of fresh economic aid, started which reinvigorated the economy.
3. Pakistan started receiving new military hardware including the F-16’s.
4. U.S generously donated during the post-quake crisis.
5. Pakistan’s standing at international forum was improved and its role as a ‘Front line state in the WOT’ received wide spread accolades and kudos. After that enlightened decision, Pakistan was visited by numerous Leaders of international stature like UK’s Premier Mr. Tony Blair, Netherlands Premier Mr. Wim Kokj, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Belgium Premier Mr. Guy Verhofstadt and many others, one on the heel of the other.
6. Bilateral relations with the U.S improved tremendously and on long term basis unlike on-again, off-again like relations in the past.
7. The world became aware of the sufferings of the people of Afghanistan.
“Appreciating Pakistan’s key role as a ‘frontline State’ in the war on terrorism, the U.S, the EU and Japan dismantled nuclear and democracy sanctions and resumed assistance to Pakistan.”
-Dr. Abdul Sattar
Former Foreign Minister in “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy”
Therefore, after critically analyzing the pros and cons of the decision it is clear that Pakistan had timely made an apropos decision. Though in our short but tremulous history, our country has swerved from one crisis to another mostly due to unavoidable circumstances but it has never faced such a more excruciating dilemma. In retrospective analysis, it can be argued that had there been a mature and stable political setup in Pakistan at that time, it would have enabled Pakistan to broaden its win-set. The delay that is inherent in the decision making process in a political setup would have worked in favour of Pakistan and would have improved its bargaining chips. Moreover, anfractuous events do happen but the most important thing is to wisely elicit the lessons from such crises. It has almost become a fashion to vociferously deplore an ‘external factor’ (read ‘Amreeka’) for our own shortcomings. It doesn’t mean that the cost that we are paying as a nation in this war is equivalent to the benefits that we have reaped. Of course, the cost far outweighs the benefits but instead of bursting into pointless polemics, we have to seek the reasons in visceral introspection.
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