A nuclearized region cannot afford any adventurism, not even a limited conventional war. Both sides need to look at doctrines that are defensive rather than offensive in intent or nature. Peace between the two countries will come only through mutual dialogue and cooperation, not through conflict and confrontation.
FAKE Degrees
Sunday, August 01, 2010
Sunday, August 01, 2010
Today's world is in turmoil. South Asia is at the root of most of its problems ranging from inter-state and civil conflicts to unresolved disputes, human tragedies, violence, extremism and terrorism. This region was globally important during the Cold War era and remains relevant to world's peace and security in today's changed environment.
With overt nuclearisation of the sub-continent, South Asia's problems are no longer an exclusive concern of the region itself. They now have a worrisome global dimension, which raises major powers' stakes in the issues of peace and security in this region. No other region in the world today is as volatile and unstable as South Asia with its longstanding legacy of India-Pakistan hostility and conflict and its crucial role in the post-9/11 scenario.
In the interest of durable peace and stability in the region, the international community as a whole has an obligation to promote an even-handed, comprehensive and non-discriminatory approach and avoid policies that create and widen nuclear disparities in the region. India’s triad-based nuclear doctrine, its aggressive ‘Cold Start’ strategy and its introduction of anti-ballistic missile system constitute ‘overkill’ for the region’s stability.
Any measures that contribute to lowering of nuclear threshold and fueling of an unnecessary arms race between the two nuclear-armed neighbours are no service to the people of this region. The policymakers in world’s major capitals, especially Washington should have been working “extra time” to promote a sense of security and justice in this region by eschewing discriminatory policies in their dealings with India-Pakistan nuclear equation, the only one in the world that grew up in history totally unrelated to the Cold War.
It is the offshoot of a long-standing legacy of India-Pakistan disputes and their perennial mode of conflict and confrontation. Durable peace in this region will remain elusive as long as the underlying causes of instability and conflict remain unaddressed. Meanwhile given their continuing tensions and war-like situations, the two countries are facing a nuclear precipice with their future remaining hostage to one accident or one strategic miscalculation. The only sure way to avert the Armageddon is for India and Pakistan to revert to sanity and dialogue.
A nuclearized region cannot afford any adventurism, not even a limited conventional war. Both sides need to look at doctrines that are defensive rather than offensive in intent or nature. They need an environment of peace and security, bilaterally, regionally and globally to be able to divert their resources for the economic wellbeing of their peoples. This requires them to maintain the lowest level of armament.
It is in this context that a group of retired senior diplomats and military officers as well as academics from both India and Pakistan recently met in Copenhagen in a Track Two event called Ottawa Dialogue, sponsored jointly by the Near East and South Asia Centre (NESA), the Hewlett Foundation, the US Institute of Peace and the Danish Foreign Ministry, and urged the two countries to resume their stalled dialogue for discussions on issues of peace and security, a key item on the agenda of the Composite Dialogue. They stressed the necessity and importance of keeping their dialogue process insulated from political climate
The members of the Ottawa Dialogue also adopted an agreed statement on actions their governments could take to help stabilise their nuclear relationship. These included establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRCs) and a jointly acceptable lexicon of “nuclear terms” applicable to the two countries, maintenance of the lowest possible alert level for nuclear weapons during peacetime, initiation of discussion on implications for South Asia of the introduction of new technologies, e.g. ABM system, and inclusion of cruise missiles in the existing pre-notification agreement on missiles established in the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding.”
It was noted that some of these and various other points have already been the subject of discussion between the two sides as part of the Composite Dialogue and many useful ideas were contained in the Lahore Declaration and the MoU of February 21, 1999. The group recommended that these frameworks should be revived and the ideas presented in their session also be placed in them.
The Pakistani participants, in particular, stressed that as part of the Composite Dialogue, the two countries had already agreed on a number of nuclear and conventional CBMs including the risk reduction measures. The process must continue so as to build upon the work already done, and to move from risk reduction CBMs to CBMs on avoidance of conflict and arms race and also conflict-resolution.
In this connection, Pakistan’s proposal for Strategic Restraint Regime involving nuclear and missile restraint, conventional balance and conflict resolution will go a long way in promoting nuclear and conventional restraint and mutual stabilization. Likewise, non-induction of ABMs and other destabilizing systems could also serve as an arms limitation measure. Arms reduction could follow in due course later as the two sides build up trust and confidence.
India remains averse to all these proposals citing its extra-regional concerns although its force potential continues to be Pakistan-specific. Though Pakistan’s actions in the nuclear and missile fields at each stage are in response to India’s escalatory steps, its policies have always been marked by restraint and responsibility. In evaluating the doctrinaire approach of the two countries, one thing becomes abundantly clear. India’s nuclear doctrine is status-driven whereas that of Pakistan is security motivated.
With overt nuclearisation of the sub-continent, South Asia's problems are no longer an exclusive concern of the region itself. They now have a worrisome global dimension, which raises major powers' stakes in the issues of peace and security in this region. No other region in the world today is as volatile and unstable as South Asia with its longstanding legacy of India-Pakistan hostility and conflict and its crucial role in the post-9/11 scenario.
In the interest of durable peace and stability in the region, the international community as a whole has an obligation to promote an even-handed, comprehensive and non-discriminatory approach and avoid policies that create and widen nuclear disparities in the region. India’s triad-based nuclear doctrine, its aggressive ‘Cold Start’ strategy and its introduction of anti-ballistic missile system constitute ‘overkill’ for the region’s stability.
Any measures that contribute to lowering of nuclear threshold and fueling of an unnecessary arms race between the two nuclear-armed neighbours are no service to the people of this region. The policymakers in world’s major capitals, especially Washington should have been working “extra time” to promote a sense of security and justice in this region by eschewing discriminatory policies in their dealings with India-Pakistan nuclear equation, the only one in the world that grew up in history totally unrelated to the Cold War.
It is the offshoot of a long-standing legacy of India-Pakistan disputes and their perennial mode of conflict and confrontation. Durable peace in this region will remain elusive as long as the underlying causes of instability and conflict remain unaddressed. Meanwhile given their continuing tensions and war-like situations, the two countries are facing a nuclear precipice with their future remaining hostage to one accident or one strategic miscalculation. The only sure way to avert the Armageddon is for India and Pakistan to revert to sanity and dialogue.
A nuclearized region cannot afford any adventurism, not even a limited conventional war. Both sides need to look at doctrines that are defensive rather than offensive in intent or nature. They need an environment of peace and security, bilaterally, regionally and globally to be able to divert their resources for the economic wellbeing of their peoples. This requires them to maintain the lowest level of armament.
It is in this context that a group of retired senior diplomats and military officers as well as academics from both India and Pakistan recently met in Copenhagen in a Track Two event called Ottawa Dialogue, sponsored jointly by the Near East and South Asia Centre (NESA), the Hewlett Foundation, the US Institute of Peace and the Danish Foreign Ministry, and urged the two countries to resume their stalled dialogue for discussions on issues of peace and security, a key item on the agenda of the Composite Dialogue. They stressed the necessity and importance of keeping their dialogue process insulated from political climate
The members of the Ottawa Dialogue also adopted an agreed statement on actions their governments could take to help stabilise their nuclear relationship. These included establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRCs) and a jointly acceptable lexicon of “nuclear terms” applicable to the two countries, maintenance of the lowest possible alert level for nuclear weapons during peacetime, initiation of discussion on implications for South Asia of the introduction of new technologies, e.g. ABM system, and inclusion of cruise missiles in the existing pre-notification agreement on missiles established in the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding.”
It was noted that some of these and various other points have already been the subject of discussion between the two sides as part of the Composite Dialogue and many useful ideas were contained in the Lahore Declaration and the MoU of February 21, 1999. The group recommended that these frameworks should be revived and the ideas presented in their session also be placed in them.
The Pakistani participants, in particular, stressed that as part of the Composite Dialogue, the two countries had already agreed on a number of nuclear and conventional CBMs including the risk reduction measures. The process must continue so as to build upon the work already done, and to move from risk reduction CBMs to CBMs on avoidance of conflict and arms race and also conflict-resolution.
In this connection, Pakistan’s proposal for Strategic Restraint Regime involving nuclear and missile restraint, conventional balance and conflict resolution will go a long way in promoting nuclear and conventional restraint and mutual stabilization. Likewise, non-induction of ABMs and other destabilizing systems could also serve as an arms limitation measure. Arms reduction could follow in due course later as the two sides build up trust and confidence.
India remains averse to all these proposals citing its extra-regional concerns although its force potential continues to be Pakistan-specific. Though Pakistan’s actions in the nuclear and missile fields at each stage are in response to India’s escalatory steps, its policies have always been marked by restraint and responsibility. In evaluating the doctrinaire approach of the two countries, one thing becomes abundantly clear. India’s nuclear doctrine is status-driven whereas that of Pakistan is security motivated.
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, though not declared, is based on credible minimum deterrence and strategic restraint and responsibility. Unlike India, Pakistan does not subscribe to No First Use policy because of its conventional asymmetry with India. In any case, India’s NFU policy carries no credence and is merely a political ploy linked to its global ambitions.
India itself paid no heed to China’s NFU and opted for nuclear weapons regardless of Chinese guarantees of no first use and no-use against non-nuclear states.
In keeping with its history of arms control and disarmament diplomacy, Pakistan has been urging for non-discriminatory and criteria-based arrangements as a way to ensure its equal treatment with India. The US-India nuclear deal and the subsequent carte blanche that India received from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for access to nuclear technology in violation of equitably applicable criteria undermine the international non-proliferation regime and detract from its credibility and legitimacy.
It was indeed ironic that the NSG, which was set up in response to the first act of nuclear proliferation in South Asia in 1974, and works on the basis of consensus to prevent further proliferation, decided unanimously to reward the perpetrator of such proliferation. Given the consensus rule anyone of these 46 nations could have blocked this decision. But none of them did so owing expediencies and profit motives or they simply lacked the courage of their convictions.
At its recent meeting in New Zealand’s capital, Wellington, NSG had an opportunity to rectify its earlier shortsighted decision and allow an equitable treatment to Pakistan at par with India. It should have realized that only criteria-based approaches on the basis of equality and non-discrimination between the two de facto nuclear weapon states would be sustainable. No wonder, there is now growing demand for these monopolist groups to be replaced by new cooperative arrangements at the regional level, supplementing the UN system and following the principles enshrined in the UN Charter.
The international community, instead of sanctifying regional imbalances, should be taking steps that encourage India-Pakistan rapprochement and conflict-resolution, and help promote nuclear restraint and stabilization in the region. Durable peace between India and Pakistan would not only be a factor of regional and global stability but would also enable the two countries to divert their resources to improving the lives of their peoples and eradicating poverty from the region.
And durable peace between the two countries will come only through mutual dialogue and cooperation, not through conflict and confrontation. The upcoming meeting of the two Foreign Ministers must revive the stalled peace process. The Composite Dialogue provides them an irreplaceable multidimensional dialogue framework. Ironically, India is now allergic to the nomenclature “Composite Dialogue” that it had itself insisted to give to the “comprehensive, sustained and meaningful” dialogue process agreed between the two countries in June 1997.
Surely, nomenclature is not important but the multidimensional framework and agenda that the existing process provides to the two countries for sustainable engagement not only on normalization of mutual relations but also on crucial issues of peace and security involving nuclear restraint and stabilization is irreplaceable. They must revert to this process, no matter what they call it.
In keeping with its history of arms control and disarmament diplomacy, Pakistan has been urging for non-discriminatory and criteria-based arrangements as a way to ensure its equal treatment with India. The US-India nuclear deal and the subsequent carte blanche that India received from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for access to nuclear technology in violation of equitably applicable criteria undermine the international non-proliferation regime and detract from its credibility and legitimacy.
It was indeed ironic that the NSG, which was set up in response to the first act of nuclear proliferation in South Asia in 1974, and works on the basis of consensus to prevent further proliferation, decided unanimously to reward the perpetrator of such proliferation. Given the consensus rule anyone of these 46 nations could have blocked this decision. But none of them did so owing expediencies and profit motives or they simply lacked the courage of their convictions.
At its recent meeting in New Zealand’s capital, Wellington, NSG had an opportunity to rectify its earlier shortsighted decision and allow an equitable treatment to Pakistan at par with India. It should have realized that only criteria-based approaches on the basis of equality and non-discrimination between the two de facto nuclear weapon states would be sustainable. No wonder, there is now growing demand for these monopolist groups to be replaced by new cooperative arrangements at the regional level, supplementing the UN system and following the principles enshrined in the UN Charter.
The international community, instead of sanctifying regional imbalances, should be taking steps that encourage India-Pakistan rapprochement and conflict-resolution, and help promote nuclear restraint and stabilization in the region. Durable peace between India and Pakistan would not only be a factor of regional and global stability but would also enable the two countries to divert their resources to improving the lives of their peoples and eradicating poverty from the region.
And durable peace between the two countries will come only through mutual dialogue and cooperation, not through conflict and confrontation. The upcoming meeting of the two Foreign Ministers must revive the stalled peace process. The Composite Dialogue provides them an irreplaceable multidimensional dialogue framework. Ironically, India is now allergic to the nomenclature “Composite Dialogue” that it had itself insisted to give to the “comprehensive, sustained and meaningful” dialogue process agreed between the two countries in June 1997.
Surely, nomenclature is not important but the multidimensional framework and agenda that the existing process provides to the two countries for sustainable engagement not only on normalization of mutual relations but also on crucial issues of peace and security involving nuclear restraint and stabilization is irreplaceable. They must revert to this process, no matter what they call it.
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